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■ Abstract We review literature on several types of energy efficiency policies: ap-
pliance standards, financial incentive programs, information and voluntary programs,
and management of government energy use. For each, we provide a brief synopsis of the
relevant programs, along with available existing estimates of energy savings, costs, and
cost-effectiveness at a national level. The literature examining these estimates points
to potential issues in determining the energy savings and costs, but recent evidence
suggests that techniques for measuring both have improved. Taken together, the liter-
ature identifies up to four quads of energy savings annually from these programs—at
least half of which is attributable to appliance standards and utility-based demand-side
management, with possible additional energy savings from the U.S. Department of
Energy’s (DOE’s) ENERGY STAR, Climate Challenge, and Section 1605b voluntary
programs to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Related reductions in CO2 and
criteria air pollutants may contribute an additional 10% to the value of energy savings
above the price of energy itself.
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INTRODUCTION
Energy efficiency plays a critical role in the U.S. energy policy debate because
future national energy needs can be met only by increasing energy supply or
decreasing energy demand. The prospects of climate change, air pollution, and
energy security all cast an undesirable shadow over an exclusive focus on increasing
energy supply to meet growing demand; current U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
are ∼1580 million metric tons of carbon equivalent (MMTCE)/year and rising
(1). Many energy efficiency advocates maintain that the vigorous use of policies
that encourage consumers and manufacturers to use less energy could effectively
manage national energy needs at very little or no cost.
By examining the past performance of many policies and programs that promote
energy efficiency, we address some important questions related to how demand-
side policies might fit into a comprehensive energy policy: Which policies and
programs have been implemented in the past? What have they accomplished, and
how do they compare? How much have the public and private sectors spent on
them? Have the policies and programs been cost-effective?
In this descriptive survey of demand-side energy efficiency policies, we focus
on the adoption of energy-efficient equipment and building practices rather than on
energy research and development. Although the applicable programs and policies
span quite a broad range, they tend to fall into four general categories: appliance
standards, financial incentive programs (for energy-efficient investments), infor-
mation and voluntary programs, and management of government energy use. We
limit the study scope by omitting building codes, professional codes, and trans-
portation polices (including Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards).
In this chapter, we present a brief history and a literature review of the cost
and effectiveness of each program category; an overall picture created from es-
timated energy savings, cost-effectiveness, and emissions reductions; and some
general conclusions. We focus our review on national-level estimates to ensure
comparability across programs. Additional details can be found in Gillingham
et al. (2).
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APPLIANCE STANDARDS
U.S. standards for the minimum energy efficiency of appliances began during
energy crisis of the the mid-1970s, when high prices and increased environmental
concerns drove many states to consider ways to cut growing energy demand (3).
California passed legislation that paved the way for New York and other states,
and manufacturers soon pushed for uniform federal standards.
Early efforts to set national standards were largely ineffective until a collabora-
tion of manufacturers and energy efficiency advocates resulted in the 1987 National
Appliance Energy Conservation Act (NAECA) (4). The NAECA established na-
tional standards for 15 categories of household appliances: refrigerators, freezers,
clothes washers, clothes dryers, dishwashers, kitchen ranges, kitchen ovens, room
air conditioners, direct heating equipment, water heaters, pool heaters, central air
conditioners, central heat pumps, furnaces, and boilers. These initial standards have
been updated several times, and standards were added for showerheads and fluo-
rescent light ballasts in 1988. The next major energy efficiency legislation was the
1992 Energy Policy Act (5), which extended standards to induction motors, many
kinds of lamps, and most types of commercial heating and cooling equipment.
Cost-Effectiveness Estimates
Many studies evaluate the effectiveness of appliance standards, in general or for
particular appliances. Most studies are ex ante, performed for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) by researchers at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, or the American Council for an Energy-Efficient
Economy; DOE Technical Support Documents also contain an extensive amount
of ex ante analysis. A few studies present ex post estimates.
Levine et al. (6) estimate the cumulative effectiveness of appliance standards
from a combination of ex post and ex ante analyses. Estimated federal government
expenditures for the appliance efficiency program are US$61(2002) million for
1979–1993; the estimated total net benefit of appliance standards for appliances
sold in 1990–2015 is $56 billion—a net present cost of $39 billion for higher-
priced appliances and a net present savings of $95 billion as a result of saved
energy operating costs. (Note: Unless otherwise noted, all monetary values are in
2002 U.S. dollars, and all present values are discounted at 7%.) Estimated energy
savings from appliance standards in 1994 alone are 0.1 quad, which represents
almost $1.23 billion. Total national carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are estimated
to decrease 1.5% to 2% by 2015 as a result of the standards.
In a widely cited ex ante study, Geller (7) estimates prospective total energy
savings from appliance standards in 2000 as 1.23 quads. Geller et al. (8) later
estimate energy savings as 1.2 quads in 2000 and cumulative net benefits of $196
billion through 2030.
In one of the few ex post analyses of appliance standards, McMahon et al.
(9) provide retrospective estimates of energy savings, net benefits, and carbon
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reductions for 1990–1997. Because few appliance standards took effect before
1990, these cumulative estimates are roughly comparable with other cumulative
estimates for 1987–1997. Estimated cumulative energy savings are 1.9 quads for
1990–1997, with a cumulative benefit from energy savings of $17 billion and
CO2 emissions reduced by 29.5 MMTCE. The largest effects are seen in the final
few years studied; 45% of the benefits and 46% of energy savings and emissions
reductions occur in 1996 and 1997. McMahon et al. (9) attribute this finding
to the increasing percentage of total appliances in use that meet the standards.
Correspondingly, the study contains ex ante forecasts of future energy savings,
net benefits, and emissions reductions from appliance standards that continue to
increase greatly.
Ex post and ex ante analyses from Meyers et al. (10) estimate past costs to the
government of implementing 1987–2000 appliance standards as $200 million to
$250 million and the cumulative net benefit for those years as $17.4 billion. This
latter amount is added to some ex ante estimates to yield a cumulative net benefit
of $154 billion and CO2 emissions reductions of 1216 MMTCE for 1987–2050.
Finally, J. McMahon (personal communication) provides the underlying time
series of estimates used in Meyers et al. (10), including the year 2000 annual
energy savings and aggregate cost to consumers and government of implementing
residential appliance standards. Estimated residential annual energy savings are
0.59 quads of electricity and 0.19 quads of natural gas for 2000; with 2000 prices
of $6.3 billion/quad for electricity and $5.6 billion/quad for natural gas, total
energy savings are $4.8 billion. The total estimated equipment cost to consumers is
$2.5 billion in 2000. This time series of energy savings and cost estimates form the
basis for an estimate of cost-effectiveness of $3.28/quad saved [for more details,
see Gillingham et al. (2, pp. 56–58)].
Critiques and Responses
Several authors are more skeptical of these estimates of cost-effectiveness. Khaz-
zoom (11) claims that energy efficiency improvements reduce the effective cost of
energy services, thereby increasing demand and inducing less-than-proportional
reductions in energy use. According to Khazzoom, this so-called take-back effect
or rebound effect implies that mandated standards do not yield the energy savings
or cost-effectiveness that ex ante estimates predict and that for some major end
uses mandated standards may even backfire by increasing energy demand.
Brookes (12) uses macroeconomic theory to expand this claim, suggesting that
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements may be a form of technological
progress that improves productivity, promotes capital investment, enhances eco-
nomic growth, and ultimately increases energy demand. Saunders (13) uses neo-
classical growth theory to assert that the combination of Brookes’s growth effect
and the rebound effect could overwhelm the demand-reducing effect of increased
energy efficiency under reasonable conditions—conditions that may hold in the
U.S. economy. Inhaber & Saunders (14) reach similar conclusions with historical
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evidence, particularly regarding the growth effect. Although these arguments have
merit, we find them taken to extreme conclusions with little supporting empirical
evidence.
In a review of energy efficiency standards for appliances, Hausman & Joskow
(15) list several inherent weaknesses to consider in any evaluation of standards.
First, although the minimum energy efficiency of appliances can be mandated by
standards, actual energy use is determined by much more uncertain consumer be-
havior, including issues such as the rebound effect. Uniform national standards do
not seem well suited to a country with substantial differences in weather charac-
teristics and energy prices and do not allow for heterogeneity in consumer tastes
for energy-using services and appliance choice (e.g., for a consumer who needs
air-conditioning only a few days per year, purchasing an inexpensive model with
low-energy efficiency may be cost-efficient). When the appropriate level of stan-
dards for promoting economic efficiency is uncertain, rigid standards may not
be the best option because they are difficult to adapt to new information about
consumer behavior and costs.
Sutherland (16, 17) argues that little or no evidence indicates that appliance stan-
dards make consumers truly better off and that much of the market failure theory
underlying optimistic net benefit estimates is misguided: if such large net bene-
fits could be gained, then consumers would already be taking advantage of them.
Sutherland also argues that appliance standards appear to be regressive because
their negative impacts are likely to affect low-income households disproportion-
ately.
Although these skeptical authors contend that empirical evidence supports their
theoretical findings, they typically do not provide it. Sutherland (18), who pro-
vides a numerical sensitivity analysis of the Meyers et al. (10) estimates, finds
that assuming significantly higher-discount rates than other studies (e.g., 21% to
28% per year) and greater baseline improvements in energy efficiency results in
a lower, and possibly negative, net present value of appliance standards. Suther-
land bases these higher-discount rates on several studies of implicit discount rates
(19–21).
Refuting the skeptics’ contentions, Grubb (22) disputes the policy relevance
of the rebound effect, stating that the conditions under which it would be im-
portant do not apply to appliance efficiency standards. In an empirical study
of the effect of efficiency improvements on residential electricity demand in
New York, Dumagan & Mount (23) find the rebound effect numerically unim-
portant. In a review of 42 field studies, Nadel (24) finds little or no rebound effect
in most cases. Stoft (25) criticizes Sutherland’s work (16) and suggests that ap-
pliance standards are not regressive. Howarth & Sanstad (26) suggest that the
energy market is replete with market failures—asymmetric information, bounded
rationality, and high transaction costs—and that appliance standards could help to
correct for the market failures.
Howarth (27) analyzes the growth effect hypothesis (12–14). According to
Howarth’s model, energy efficiency improvements would not increase energy use
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unless two implausible conditions hold: energy costs dominate the total (energy and
nonenergy) cost of energy services, and spending on energy services constitutes
a large share of economic activity. Weil & McMahon (28) cite several empirical
studies that suggest the benefit of well-designed appliance standards.
Nadel (29) observes that energy efficiency improvements stagnate between
periods during which new standards take effect (indicating the standards’ success)
and suggests that some analyses (such as DOE’s) overestimate the cost of appliance
standards by not considering economies of scale in the manufacture of energy-
efficient products. Nadel points to data from other sources, such as the Census of
Manufacturers (30), that tend to show more modest appliance cost increases than
DOE estimates (which form the basis for the Meyers et al. estimates). For example,
census data indicate that the average value per unit of manufacturer refrigerator
shipments was $9 lower in 2002 than in 2000, whereas DOE predicted the new
refrigerator standard that took effect in mid-2001 would increase manufacturer
costs by an average of about $25/unit. Nadel emphasizes that similar trends have
been observed in other product standards, indicating that confounding factors are
highly unlikely. Nadel also takes issue with the concept that appliance standards
are more regressive by observing that appliance standards reduce the cost of more-
efficient appliances and force landlords to purchase such appliances (31) and by
claiming that both of these results benefit, rather than hurt, low-income households
(32).
In a theoretical model, Fischer (33) illustrates the impacts of energy efficiency
standards that depend on the structure of the household appliance market. On the
one hand, producers may price discriminate and use energy efficiency to segment
consumer demand by designing cheap models that underprovide energy efficiency
as well as expensive energy-efficient models; thus, appliance standards can im-
prove welfare, even for low-income consumers. On the other hand, a perfectly
competitive market would offer the energy efficiency that consumers demand,
and appliance standards would not improve welfare. Empirical work is needed to
determine which case holds.
Finally, McInerney & Anderson (34) present the manufacturer’s perspective on
appliance standards: past appliance standards have been cost-effective for and not
too much of a burden on manufacturers, but more stringent standards may not lead
to similar results.
Although it is difficult to completely reconcile the more critical studies with
the responses, differences in assumptions and methodologies underlie the differ-
ent results. Most of the critiques present theoretical arguments rather than em-
pirical evidence. Sutherland (18) is a notable exception but makes quite differ-
ent assumptions about discount rates and other key parameters than most other
empirical studies. In fact, most empirical studies provide evidence at the state
or program level, supporting the cost-effectiveness of appliance standards. Fur-
ther empirical research would be useful to examine the practical importance of
the theoretical criticisms and generalize the results of the many program-level
studies.
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FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
Private or public entities can use direct financial enticements to encourage con-
sumers and companies to invest in energy-efficient technology and cut energy
demand.
Utility-Based Demand-Side Management Programs
Various demand-side management (DSM) policies attempt to help utilities match
energy demand with generating capacity (35). In this context, DSM originally
meant actions that utilities would take to change patterns of customer electricity
use and thereby modify the pattern of the utility’s load (36), but this definition has
grown to include the promotion of energy efficiency and conservation (37).
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR CONSUMER PURCHASES After the energy crisis of the
1970s, federal regulators and state public service commissions began implement-
ing utility policies that led to the creation of utility-based DSM programs. The
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (1975), Energy Conservation and Produc-
tion Act (1976), and National Energy Conservation Policy Act (1978) provided
encouragement for utility-based conservation and load management programs, as
did rulings in favor of DSM by many state utility commissions. The Public Util-
ity Regulatory Policies Act (1978) required state public service commissions to
consider energy conservation in rate-making practices, furthering the impetus for
utility-based DSM programs (38).
Several strategies have been implemented since the 1970s, starting with in-
formation and loan programs (to educate consumers and businesses about the
cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency measures and to provide low-cost subsi-
dized financing for energy efficiency investments in such measures) and cash
rebates (for the purchase of designated energy-efficient equipment). Utilities de-
siring to increase energy savings implemented comprehensive DSM programs
(which often combined information with financial assistance and direct installa-
tion of energy-efficient equipment). Market transformation strategies [changes to
make more-efficient equipment or energy services the norm (39)] were empha-
sized in the 1990s when DSM programs became standard operating practice for
many utilities. Around the same time, pressure began for electricity deregulation
and restructuring (allowing independent power producers to sell electricity in
wholesale markets and customers to choose suppliers). As DSM funding plum-
meted in the mid to late 1990s, public benefit funds [to finance energy efficiency
programs, investments in renewable energy, energy assistance to low-income fami-
lies, and other designated public benefit activities (40)] were introduced. Estimates
of utility-based DSM spending and associated energy savings are listed in Table 1;
see Gillingham et al. (2) for details on and discussion of these programs.
The Super Efficient Refrigerator Program (SERP) was a market transformation
initiative implemented in the early 1990s, the heyday of DSM. Its general goal
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TABLE 1 U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA) estimates of utility demand-side management
(DSM) spending, 1989–2004 (41, 42)
Energy savings (GWh)b
Year
DSM spending
US$(2002)
millionsa Incrementalc Annual
1989 $1,266 NA 14,672
1990 $1,621 NA 20,458
1991 $2,383 NA 24,848
1992 $3,011 6,712 35,563
1993 $3,416 9,002 45,294
1994 $3,297 8,248 52,483
1995 $2,858 8,243 57,421
1996 $2,181 6,857 61,842
1997 $1,834 4,860 56,406
1998 $1,568 3,379 49,167
1999 $1,537 3,103 50,563
2000 $1,635 3,364 53,701
2001 $1,656 4,492 53,936
2002 $1,626 3,802 54,075
2003 $1,268 2,981 50,265
2004 $1,483 4,539 54,710
aSpending includes funds on energy efficiency and, to a lesser degree, load
management and load building.
bAbbreviations: 1 gigawatt-hour (GWh) = 1 million kilowatt-hours
(kWh); NA, not applicable.
cIncremental energy savings refers to savings associated with new partici-
pants in existing DSM programs and all participants in new DSM programs
in a given year, annualized to indicate the effects, assuming that participants
began the program on January 1 of that year.
was to spur the development of substantially more efficient refrigerators than the
then-current models in order to lay a foundation for stronger federal refrigerator
standards. The SERP incentive scheme was designed to reward manufacturers for
maximum energy savings, minimum incentive payments, and commitment to a
speedy delivery schedule.
Twenty-five utilities pledged $30.7 million in DSM funds to SERP. The man-
ufacturer to achieve the most energy savings would receive guaranteed rebates
for selling its super-efficient refrigerators in the participating utilities’ service ar-
eas. Fourteen manufacturers submitted bids, and Whirlpool Corporation won a
contract in July 1993 to begin shipping units the following year. By 1998, how-
ever, Whirlpool had pulled its line after selling far fewer than their proposed
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250,000 units (estimates indicate fewer than 100,000) and earning far less than
expected in total incentive payments. Suozzo & Nadel (43) note that Whirlpool’s
large high-end model was more expensive than most other refrigerators on the
market, and its side-by-side design filled a limited market niche. Its size was in-
tentional; the SERP bid scoring system credited the total number (rather than the
percentage) of kilowatt-hours saved per refrigerator.
Despite the market failure of its award-winning refrigerator, SERP spurred
significant energy efficiency gains in Whirlpool refrigerators and modest gains in
other brands (44), and DOE set the 2001 standard for refrigerator energy efficiency
at the same level as that of the winning bid. Unfortunately, no SERP evaluation
provides ex post estimates of energy savings or the program’s cost-effectiveness.
ELECTRICITY LOAD MANAGEMENT Electricity load management programs
evolved simultaneously with financial incentives for consumer purchases. They
aim to limit peak electricity loads, shift peak loads to off-peak hours, or change
consumer demand in response to changes in utilities’ costs of providing power.
All such programs use financial incentives to encourage consumer participation.
 Direct load control programs allow a utility to directly control a customer’s
equipment (typically residential air-conditioning), interrupting power supply
during periods of peak system demand, and customers usually receive a
rebate or discount on their electric bills.
 Interruptible load programs are contracts between a utility and large com-
mercial or industrial customers to interrupt the power supply at any time—
during periods of peak demand or when the market price of electricity rises
above an agreed-upon rate (38)—by direct control or direct request of the
utility system operator.
 Voluntary demand-response programs are similar to interruptible load pro-
grams but without contractual obligations. Utilities often pay customers for
requested load reductions.
 Real-time pricing tariffs give customers (mostly industrial, some large com-
mercial) the option to reduce energy demand during peak (high-cost) periods
or switch demand to nonpeak (low-cost) periods to reduce electricity bills.
 Demand bidding programs allow consumers to specify a reservation bid for
a load reduction. When the market-clearing price of electricity is at or above
the reservation bid price, the consumer reduces demand by the specified
amount in exchange for a payment (45).
Other such programs include funding or subsidizing technologies that shift all
or part of a load from one time of day to another or promote the use of distributed
generation in response to a signal from the utility.
Only the largest, most flexible consumers have been actively and regularly
interested in load management programs (45). Interruptible load and direct load
control programs have had few long-term participants, and few consumers are
15 Sep 2006 19:54 AR ANRV289-EG31-06.tex XMLPublishSM(2004/02/24) P1: OKZ
170 GILLINGHAM  NEWELL  PALMER
willing to pay prices that vary with wholesale electricity prices in real time. Over
time, utilities have shifted to more voluntary demand-response programs in an
effort to increase participation. Still, all categories of load management programs
are still active and play an important role in utility-based DSM (46).
Among load management programs, direct load control is most likely to re-
duce total energy use because consumers are unlikely to switch energy use to
another time (e.g., a residential consumer whose air conditioner was temporarily
shut off during the day is unlikely to increase usage at night). Interruptible load
programs are less likely to save energy for industrial manufacturers, which gen-
erally reschedule interrupted production. Hence, utility-based DSM spending on
financial incentives for electricity load management tends to be more useful for
other utility objectives (e.g., shaving peak load) than for saving energy.
DSM COST-EFFECTIVENESS ESTIMATES Information pertaining to the cost-
effectiveness of utility-based DSM tends to fall into three categories: negawatt
cost, utility spending on DSM, or energy savings. Negawatt (or negawatt-hour)
cost, used since the late 1980s, typically refers to the full life cycle cost (i.e., total
expense of running the program and installing equipment but not the dollar value of
electricity savings) per kilowatt-hour (kWh) saved as a result of a DSM program.
Negawatt costs are useful for comparing the cost-effectiveness of different DSM
programs but require information or assumptions about each program’s life cycle.
Estimates of utilities’ spending on and energy savings from DSM programs
[which utilities have been required to report to the U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA) since 1989] tend to be annual, and most programs have an
up-front cost that generates savings many years into the future, making mean-
ingful comparisons with negawatt cost estimates difficult. The following ranges
provide a sense of the state of the literature focused on utility-run DSM programs:
 Negawatt costs are $0.008–$0.229/kWh saved.
 Although estimates of energy savings differ by year, total energy savings
from all utility-based DSM projects in 2004 were ∼54,710 gigawatt-hours
(GWh), and incremental or new energy savings were ∼4,539 GWh per
year.
 Estimates of utility-based DSM spending in 2004 were $1.48 billion
(Table 1).
Negawatt Costs Many national studies of the cost-effectiveness of utility-based
DSM programs focus on negawatt costs. Nadel (47) estimates utility-based DSM
negawatt costs to be $0.019–$0.067/kWh saved. (Note: All negawatt costs are
reported in 2002 dollars.) In the same general range, Jordan & Nadel (48) find
a negawatt cost for industrial rebate programs of $0.028/kWh saved. Other com-
monly cited estimates of negawatt costs published in the early 1990s include Lovins
and colleagues’ (49) $0.008/kWh saved and the Electric Power Research Institute’s
(EPRI’s) $0.036/kWh saved (36). Many such estimates compare favorably with the
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levelized cost of energy (which includes the cost of generation capital amortized
over the life of the generating facility) from new generating units in the United
States in 1991, which was $0.067–$0.133/kWh (48).
Joskow & Marron (50) claim that the true utility cost of purchasing negawatts is
substantially higher than the Lovins and EPRI estimates because of the
unaccounted-for effects of free riders (i.e., consumers who participate in the pro-
gram but would have saved energy without the program), underreporting by utilities
of all relevant costs, and optimistic assumptions in the engineering analysis of en-
ergy savings that are not based on actual experience (e.g., that consumers keep
equipment for its useful lifetime rather than retire it early). They suggest that the
societal cost of negawatts is often underestimated by a factor of two or more on
average.
Several subsequent researchers estimate negawatt costs below the upper bound
of Nadel’s (47) estimate. For all utility-based DSM programs, Eto et al. (51) find
$0.038/kWh saved. Raynolds & Cowart (52) cite a 1994 EIA study that reports a
mean utility cost for energy efficiency programs of $0.035/kWh saved. In a review,
Nadel & Geller (53) provide estimated negawatt cost ranges for the program from
two perspectives: utility cost only ($0.030–$0.042/kWh saved) and total resources
(utility cost plus cost to consumer; $0.048–$0.071/kWh saved). The latter estimates
are close to what Joskow & Marron (50) suggest would be appropriate.
Finally, in a recent ex post study, Loughran & Kulick (54) attempt to resolve
the issue of free riders econometrically to produce national negawatt estimates
for 1989–1999: $0.146–$0.229/kWh saved for the full sample of 324 utilities and
$0.063–$0.125/kWh saved for a subsample of the larger of these utilities (and
presumably more experienced with utility-based DSM programs). In comparison,
the utilities estimated an average of $0.02–$0.03/kWh saved. They find that the
true energy savings from DSM programs typically are smaller than utilities report,
leading to higher estimates of negawatt costs. In response, Geller & Attali (55)
assert that Loughran & Kulick measured only the initial year’s energy savings from
efficiency investments, rather than the energy savings over the lifetime of efficiency
measures. This would imply that the negawatt cost estimated by Loughran & Kulick
is not based on the full benefits of energy efficiency investments and is therefore
inappropriate as a measure for judging whether or not utility DSM programs have
been cost-effective.
However, we believe this criticism is misplaced and is due to a misunderstanding
of the econometric approach taken by Loughran & Kulick. Loughran & Kulick
evaluate the effects of lagged DSM spending on changes in megawatt-hours of
electricity consumption at the utility level. This differencing approach, which is
common in econometrics, is used to control for unobserved factors that vary across
utilities that could simultaneously affect both electricity sales and the adoption of
energy efficiency policies. Through differencing, Loughran & Kulick better iden-
tify the effects of current and recent past DSM spending on energy consumption.
One way to conceptualize this approach is that the change in energy consump-
tion from one year to the next is associated with recent investments in energy
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efficiency because previous investments in energy efficiency would have already
affected previous years’ energy consumption.
Annual Energy Savings and DSM Spending Although not directly comparable
with estimated negawatt costs, estimates of annual energy savings and utility
spending provide useful information about the cost-effectiveness of utility-based
DSM programs. Hirst (56) states that utilities saved 14,800 GWh in 1989 and
17,100 GWh in 1990, costing utilities $1235 million and $1678 million, respec-
tively. (Note: Unless otherwise indicated, annual savings data in this section include
the benefits of past and present utility-based DSM programs.) In 1990, utility-based
DSM expenditures accounted for 0.7% of total annual U.S. electricity revenues,
with a corresponding energy savings of 0.6% of total annual energy use. Hirst (57)
also estimates 1992 energy savings from utility-based DSM programs as 0.5% of
total annual energy use.
Additional estimates of energy savings include 32,995 GWh/year for 1990
(58), considerably higher than Hirst’s (56); 16,300, 18,700, 23,300, and 31,800
GWh/year, respectively, for 1989–1992 (59); and 27 quads cumulatively for 1973–
1998 (52).
EIA estimates of energy savings and spending (Table 1) imply that utility-based
DSM programs saved 1.6% of all electric energy consumed in 2001, assuming
that all utility-based DSM energy savings are derived from reduced electricity use.
Nadel & Kushler (40) modify annual EIA estimates to account for some missing
data and add estimates for some prior years; their 20,458-GWh estimate for 1990
falls between those of Hirst (59) and Faruqui et al. (58). More recently, York
& Kushler (60) augment EIA utility-based DSM energy savings estimates with
energy savings estimates associated with public benefits programs (typically run
by state agencies) to find total 2003 savings from electricity DSM programs of
more than 67,000 GWh.
Because utilities self-report energy savings, the EIA estimates are far from
perfect. Hirst (61) suggests that utilities may define DSM programs differently
(e.g., some may include load-building programs in reported data, even though
EIA explicitly states that they should not) and that, although improvements have
been made in recent years, no single standardized method is used for estimating
the effects of DSM programs. Some utilities may use engineering life cycle data,
which probably yield higher estimates than in-place lifetime data from surveys
or field studies (62). Some utilities may report energy savings at the consumer
meter and others at the generator (readings of which differ by 5% to 15%). Finally,
whereas most utilities attempt to account for free riders and report the savings that
can be attributed directly to the program, others report only total savings. Methods
used to account for free riders also differ.
Horowitz (63) claims that utilities have underreported energy savings from com-
mercial DSM programs for 1997–1999 and overestimated the rate of retirement
of commercial equipment. Horowitz also suggests that true commercial DSM sav-
ings should have been 7.7% higher than reported in 1997 and 17.3% higher than
reported in 1998 and 1999.
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Interpreting Cost-Effectiveness Estimates The literature reflects many schools of
thought about how to best interpret cost-effectiveness values, but a few common
threads stand out. Several authors have pointed out shortcomings in the methods
used to calculate DSM savings, leading to overestimates of savings or underes-
timates of costs. Nichols (64) suggests that total resource cost calculations may
disregard some costs and benefits (e.g., differences in quality, time spent filling
out forms). Nichols thus proposes basing estimates on consumer surplus, which
may yield lower net benefits. Several authors suggest there is cause for concern in
how utilities handle free riders (65–68), the rebound effect (66), and moral hazard
issues (deferring conservation investment to wait for a financial incentive program)
(66, 69). The strongest concerns have been over free ridership, with Krietler (67)
estimating that up to 80% of energy savings in some programs is from free riders,
and the results of Loughran & Kulick (54) implying that adjusting for free riders
could reduce energy savings by as much as 50% to 90%. These estimates of the
impact of free riders are consistent with findings that roughly 70% of reported en-
ergy savings in a Southern California Edison industrial DSM program would have
occurred in absence of the program (70) and with similar findings for a Midwest
utility (71).
However, there is a significant literature that, although acknowledging these
issues in theory, finds in practice energy savings are typically estimated well (e.g.,
72–74). Vine & Kushler (75) note that the evaluation of DSM programs may in
principle be no more uncertain than the evaluation of supply side resources and
that an examination of studies reveals little bias and good levels of precision in the
estimates. Goldman et al. (76) point to considerable improvements in recent years
in the measurement of energy savings and costs as the industry has become more
sophisticated.
Several papers also directly address some of the concerns raised above. Levine
& Sonnenblick (77) disagree with Nichols (64), stating that the total resource cost
method most accurately represents actual program results and may even underes-
timate the true benefits of utility-based DSM programs. Sanstad & Howarth (78)
draw similar conclusions. Eto et al. (51) posit that additional spillover or “free-
driver” effects (which would occur if nonparticipants were induced to invest in
conservation because others in the program made such investments) may balance
out the free-rider effect in many cases. Indeed, in a recent study, the New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority (79) finds that for several DSM
programs free drivers more than offset free riders. Eto et al. (80) examine 20 com-
mercial lighting programs, using a methodology similar to that used by Joskow
and Marron, and find that all of these programs are cost-effective and do not suffer
greatly from Joskow and Marron’s criticisms. Nadel (personal communication)
suggests that estimates from well-designed individual programs have modest total
DSM costs, even when consumer costs are included. For example, a statewide
program in Vermont that serves the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors
is estimated to have reduced statewide electricity use by more than 1% per year
at an average total cost (utility costs plus customer costs) of about $0.042/kWh
[Nadel’s calculations are based on data from Efficiency Vermont (81)].
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In a recent work, Geller & Attali (55) provide a comprehensive rebuttal to nearly
all of the major criticisms of energy efficiency DSM programs, citing much of the
literature. Geller emphasizes that recent programs are designed to mitigate free-
rider issues and that spillover and free-driver effects may more than compensate
for free-rider effects.
Income Tax Credits or Deductions
Income tax credits or deductions have occasionally been used as a policy instrument
to encourage energy conservation. The Energy Tax Act of 1978 (ETA) provided
a federal tax credit for residential energy efficiency investments to homes built
after 1977 and encouraged residential investment in solar, wind, and geothermal
energy technologies. About 30 million claims for conservation tax credits were
filed (∼$166/claim) from 1978–1985, amounting to nearly $5 billion (in nomi-
nal dollars) in lost tax revenues (82). Reagan-era tax reform legislation brought
ETA to an early end in the mid-1980s (incentives were designed to expire in
1987). Following two decades without federal tax incentives, the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 authorizes tax credits to owners of hybrid vehicles, homeowners who
make energy-efficient home improvements, and manufacturers of energy-efficient
appliances.
State conservation tax credits or deductions began prior to ETA. For instance,
in addition to the federal conservation tax credits that existed from 1979–1985,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, and Oregon offered credits and
Arkansas, Idaho, and Indiana offered deductions during this period (83). Informa-
tion from recent state tax forms indicates that six states still offer some type of
conservation tax credit or deduction. [For more details on the history of income
tax credits and deductions, see Gillingham et al. (2).]
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of energy conservation tax credits is
mixed. Carpenter & Chester (84) find that, although 86.8% of more than 5000
homeowners who responded to a survey were aware of the ETA78 federal tax
credit, only 34.5% actually filed a claim between 1978 and 1980, and of those who
did, 94% would have invested even without the tax incentive. Using different data
from the same survey, Durham et al. (85) econometrically determine that the level
of state tax credits has a statistically significant effect on the probability of solar
installation, with an elasticity of 0.76 with respect to the level of the tax credit.
Two other studies econometrically estimate the effect of tax incentives on all
conservation investment but with different findings: very small and statistically
insignificant but positive (86) and slightly negative (87). Hassett & Metcalf (83)
identify methodological reasons for these prior findings. First, deduction-based
state tax programs may not be correctly accounted for in some early papers. Second
and more important, Hassett & Metcalf control for specific individual effects (e.g.,
conservation “taste” factors and housing attributes) that they claim are likely to
be correlated with the explanatory variables (e.g., whether a state introduces a
tax credit or deduction) and find that a change of 10 percentage points in the tax
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price for energy investment increases the probability of making an investment
by 24%.
In another econometric analysis, Williams & Poyer (88) find that tax credits
play a statistically significant role in explaining improvements related to energy
conservation. Like Hassett & Metcalf (83), they imply that despite the presence of
free riders, the 1980s tax credits were somewhat effective in spurring conservation
investment, perhaps because of spillovers (e.g., the tax credit induced conservation
investment by some consumers who then failed to file a claim) (S. Nadel, personal
communication).
INFORMATION AND VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS
All the information and voluntary programs considered here attempt to induce
energy-efficient investment by providing information about potential energy sav-
ings or examples of energy savings.
Section 1605b of the 1992 Energy Policy Act (P.L. 102–485) mandated that
DOE create a national inventory of greenhouse gases and a national database of
voluntary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from 1987 forward. The database
allows a company to make public commitments to future reductions, set goals,
and thereby improve its public image. EIA’s cost for 1605b administration was
$1.4 million in 1994, $1.65 million in 1995, and $0.44 million in 1998 (89).
These costs subsequently leveled off to $0.46 million for data collection, software
updates, and report publication in 2000 (P. McArdle, personal communication).
In 2000, reductions associated with energy efficiency conservation projects that
were registered with Section 1605b amounted to 6.083 MMTCE (P. McArdle, per-
sonal communication)—an energy savings of about 0.411 quads, calculated using
an average nontransportation emissions rate of 14.75 MMTCE/quad (41). Some
unknown percentage of these registered emissions reductions probably would have
occurred in the absence of the 1605b program. The true amount of emissions re-
duced by the program probably is between 0 and 6.083 MMTCE.
A voluntary partnership between DOE and national utility trade associations
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Climate Challenge was launched in October
1993. The program stopped accepting new applicants after 2000; however, DOE
still runs it for existing participants, who are encouraged to make new commit-
ments. As of 2000, 124 partnerships with national industry trade associations rep-
resented 651 utilities and commitments to reduce carbon emissions by more than
47.6 MMTCE by 2000 (90). Many if not most of these commitments were fulfilled
with utility-based DSM programs, so Climate Challenge may have partly encour-
aged the energy savings and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions associated
with utility-based DSM programs.
The 1605b-registered Climate Challenge emissions reductions in 2000 that were
not associated with utility-based DSM programs amounted to 12.038 MMTCE
(P. McArdle, personal communication)—an energy savings of about 0.814 quads
[calculated using an average nontransportation emissions rate of 14.75 MMTCE/
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quad (41)]. Like in the 1605b program, the amount of these registered emissions
reductions attributable exclusively to Climate Challenge could be 0–12.038
MMTCE.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) initiated the ENERGY STAR
labeling program in response to a provision of the 1992 Energy Policy Act. EN-
ERGY STAR encompasses many voluntary programs designed to encourage con-
sumers to buy energy-efficient models and manufacturers to improve the energy
efficiency of their products. EPA and DOE now jointly run the program for more
than 35 product categories (e.g., major appliances, office equipment, and home
electronics) as well as new homes and commercial and industrial buildings; see
Gillingham et al. (2) for a full list.
Several public-private partnerships fall under the auspices of ENERGY STAR:
Green Lights (promotes the use of energy-efficient lighting in commercial and in-
dustrial buildings), Climate Wise (promotes energy efficiency in commercial and
industrial buildings), the Green Power Partnership (encourages organizations to
buy renewable energy), the Combined Heat and Power Partnership (builds volun-
tary cooperative relationships to increase efficiency and decrease energy usage and
greenhouse gas emissions), and ENERGY STAR Home Sealing (improves home
energy performance when remodeling or renovating). By 2001, ENERGY STAR
had facilitated partnerships between the government and more than 7000 public-
and private-sector organizations (91).
EPA estimates that several ENERGY STAR activities saved more than
80 billion kWh and avoided the use of 10,000 megawatts of peak generating ca-
pacity in 2001 (92). The ENERGY STAR label is widely recognized (by more than
40% of the American public), and more than 750 million ENERGY STAR prod-
ucts were purchased through 2001. More than 57,000 ENERGY STAR–labeled
homes have been constructed, reducing energy costs by an estimated $15 million
annually. Determining the degree to which these energy savings were induced by
the ENERGY STAR program is difficult; some likely would have occurred in the
absence of the program.
EPA also estimates the net present value through 2012 of all ENERGY STAR–
related investments made through 2001: energy bill savings of US$(2001)
75.9 billion, incremental technology expenditures of $10.7 billion, and net savings
of $65.2 billion (92). These savings are associated with an estimated reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions of 241 MMTCE.
In recent years, EPA has spent ∼$50 million on administering all ENERGY
STAR programs (D. Malloy, personal communication). We found no estimates
of costs to consumers who take part in ENERGY STAR programs, but EPA (92)
suggests that there are none because reduced energy spending more than makes
up for any participation costs.
A few researchers address the cost-effectiveness of ENERGY STAR programs.
DeCanio (93) finds that because organizational and institutional factors are impor-
tant impediments to energy efficiency, voluntary programs such as the Green Lights
Program can induce energy-saving investment, improve corporate performance,
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and reduce pollution. DeCanio & Watkins (94) present similar conclusions in an
econometric analysis of Green Lights data.
Webber et al. (95) estimate the cumulative energy savings, undiscounted en-
ergy bill savings, and avoided carbon emissions attributable to ENERGY STAR
programs [also see Gillingham et al. (2, Table 7)]. In a review, Howarth et al. (96)
suggest that Green Lights and other ENERGY STAR programs successfully save
energy by reducing market failures related to imperfect information and bounded
rationality. They also suggest that the programs do not suffer greatly from the
rebound effect (mentioned in the section on appliance standards).
Four DOE programs are dedicated to improving the energy efficiency of build-
ings and developing voluntary public-private partnerships.
 Building America provides technical assistance to home builders and fa-
cilitates dialogue about energy efficiency between segments of the home-
building industry that traditionally work independently. As of 2000, this
program had been involved in the construction of more than 2000 houses
in 24 states (97).
 Rebuild America builds partnerships among communities, states, and the
private sector to improve the energy efficiency of any building. According
to DOE, the program had involved nearly 500 public-private partnerships
by the end of 2002 and engaged in 600 projects in 2001 and more than 800
projects in 2002 (98). Annual energy savings from these projects amounted
to 9 trillion Btu, valued at $131 million. Annual pollution reductions (esti-
mated from reduced electricity consumption) were 3349 metric tons of sul-
fur dioxide (SO2), 1576 metric tons of nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 768,239
metric tons of CO2. Every federal dollar invested in the program saved
an estimated $18.43 and generated $9.38 in private investment in energy
efficiency (98).
 High Performance Buildings is a research and information initiative be-
tween DOE and engineers, architects, building owners and occupants, or
contractors to improve the energy efficiency of new commercial (primarily
office) buildings.
 Zero Energy Buildings is an initiative to construct superenergy-efficient
residential homes that rely on renewable distributed generation for most
energy needs, potentially resulting in a net-zero annual energy consump-
tion. DOE has partnered with four home-building teams to further develop
the concept and inform home builders.
The last two of these initiatives are small and relatively new, so few assessments
of their cost-effectiveness have been published (99).
Partnership for Advanced Technology in Housing
The voluntary Partnership for Advanced Technology in Housing (PATH) teams the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with home builders,
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product manufacturers, insurance companies, and financial companies to improve
the energy efficiency, affordability, durability, environmental sustainability, and
resistance to natural disasters of residential housing (100).
Energy efficiency is not PATH’s only objective but is a primary one. In 2000,
PATH set a goal to reduce energy use in 15 million existing residential homes
by 30% or more by 2010 (101). An independent review (102) finds this goal
laudable but largely unattainable because of other somewhat incompatible goals
[e.g., more than 80% of PATH’s annual congressional funding—$980,000 in 1998,
$10 million in 1999 through 2001, and $8.75 million in 2002—is dedicated to
research and development activities (103)]. An evaluation of 56 PATH activities
initiated between 1999 and 2001 recommends program improvements but offers no
estimated energy or cost savings resulting from the energy efficiency component
of the program (103).
Industrial Energy Audits
DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Industrial Technolo-
gies Program, runs two activities primarily focused on industrial energy audits:
industrial assessment centers (IACs) and plant-wide assessments (PWAs).
Since 1976, DOE’s IACs have encouraged improvements in industrial energy
efficiency by conducting free energy, waste, and productivity assessments for
small- and medium-sized companies. Teams of faculty and students from 26 U.S.
university-based IACs perform ∼25 assessments per university per year, saving the
average participating manufacturing facility an estimated $55,000 annually (104).
IACs saved an estimated 467 trillion Btu of energy between 1977 and 2001 for
an undiscounted cumulative savings of nearly US$2(2001) billion (105). Current
program administration costs are about $7 million/year (106).
Manufacturers that are too large to qualify for free IAC audits may qualify
for PWAs. Facilities compete for awards of up to $100,000 per proposal to fund
energy-efficient investments, of which the manufacturer must pay at least 50%.
PWA participants typically save an estimated $1 million or more in energy costs
over fewer than 18 months (107).
Little empirical literature evaluates the cost-effectiveness of IACs and PWAs.
Tonn & Martin (108) suggest that three IAC benefits influence firms’ decision
making related to energy efficiency: direct energy assessment, employment of
IAC student alumni, and use of energy efficiency information from an IAC website.
They also find a significant increase in the number of energy efficiency investments
firms made within a short period. Anderson & Newell (106) find that, whereas
unmeasured project-related factors influence energy efficiency investments, most
plants respond to costs and benefits presented in energy audits; typical investment
payback thresholds are 15 months or less (hurdle rate of 80% or greater). They
also find that plants reject about half the recommended projects as economically
undesirable.
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State Programs for Industrial Energy Efficiency
Some states and regional bodies offer industrial programs for innovation and com-
petitiveness, many of which are specifically dedicated to improving energy ef-
ficiency. Of ∼300 such programs, some of the most well known are in Iowa,
New York, Texas, and Wisconsin. Many state programs coordinate activities
through DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Industrial
Technologies Program (109). Because state programs are so numerous and diverse,
the literature offers little on the overall cost-effectiveness and energy savings from
these programs.
Product Labeling Requirement (EnergyGuide)
In response to a directive in the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued the Appliance Labeling Rule (109a) in
November 1979. This rule created the well-known EnergyGuide label on which
a manufacturer quantifies a specific model’s energy consumption and energy ef-
ficiency within a range that includes highest and lowest values for comparable
models in the market, thus allowing consumers to compare efficiency across mod-
els. The label also provides an estimated yearly cost to operate the appliance on the
basis of national averages. Major household appliances subject to such labeling
include refrigerators and freezers, dishwashers, clothes washers, water heaters,
room air conditioners, furnaces, and central air conditioners (5).
Unlike voluntary ENERGY STAR labeling, EnergyGuide labeling is manda-
tory. Still, the two programs have the same purpose: to provide consumers with
information that encourages them to consider energy efficiency in appliance pur-
chasing decisions. Little analysis has been published on whether EnergyGuide’s
influence on consumer behavior is significant. Weil & McMahon (28) offer anec-
dotal evidence that such labeling programs can be successful. Newell et al. (110)
find that when product-labeling requirements are in effect, increased energy prices
encourage manufacturers to offer more energy-efficient products.
In contrast, some literature on utility-based DSM informational programs
(6, 111) claims that, in general, labeling programs are fairly ineffective, partly
because of a lack of retail compliance with EnergyGuide requirements [e.g., in
2001, the FTC found that in 70 of 144 U.S. showrooms inspected some or all
products were unlabeled (112)]. Thorne & Egan (111) suggest redesigning Ener-
gyGuide labels and discuss successful international programs.
Federal Weatherization Assistance Programs
Programs promoting weatherization assistance were among the first federal en-
ergy conservation efforts. They primarily help low-income households pay energy
bills through the finance and implementation of residential energy conservation
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investments that result in corresponding energy savings. The combined budget
of the two major programs is consistently higher than that of any other federal
program funding energy conservation in buildings.
DOE’s Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) was authorized under Title
IV of the Energy Conservation and Production Act (P. L. 94-385) in 1976 to help
low-income households reduce energy use through weatherization. Approximately
5 million (of nearly 27 million eligible) households have received weatherization
services since the program began. Each state sets its own eligibility criteria, with
the minimum criterion being a household income below 125% of the poverty
line.
A few values help gauge the program’s cost-effectiveness. Berry & Schweitzer
(113) performed a meta-evaluation of WAP, amassing small surveys to estimate the
average net savings of roughly 100,000 homes weatherized annually at 29.1 million
Btu/home/year and a total fuel reduction of 21.9%. WAP promotional material
(114) expands on this estimate, claiming that, on average, WAP reduces national
energy demand by the equivalent of 15 million barrels of oil/year and reduces
annual CO2 emissions by 0.85 metric tons of carbon for natural gas-heated homes
and 0.475 metric tons of carbon for homes with electric heat. Avoided energy
costs to the 5 million total weatherized households was ∼$1 billion during winter
2000–2001.
Department of Health and Human Services’s Low-Income Home Energy As-
sistance Program (LIHEAP) was authorized by Title XXVI of the Low-Income
Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981. States receive block grants to use for direct
home heating and cooling assistance, energy crisis assistance, and home weather-
ization programs. Up to 15% (usually ∼10%) of LIHEAP funds can be used for
weatherization. In fiscal year (FY) 2002, LIHEAP was allocated ∼$1.7 billion,
of which $201 million (∼12%) was used for weatherization (115). Funds for heat-
ing and cooling assistance and energy crisis assistance—which are effectively
energy subsidies for low-income households—are more likely to increase than to
decrease energy consumption. Thus, LIHEAP probably causes a net increase in
energy consumption.
Beginning in the 1980s, a federal Petroleum Violation Escrow (PVE) fund was
established from legal penalties assessed against oil companies for violating price
controls. By 2002, most states had exhausted PVE funds, so the FY 2002 total was
only $6.9 million. However, even at their peak, PVE funds were never as large a
funding source as WAP or LIHEAP. Funding from utility-based DSM programs,
state general fund revenues, property owner contributions, and rehabilitation grants
for low-income housing weatherization activities totaled an estimated $122 million
in FY 2002 (115).
WAP, LIHEAP, and other funding sources allowed the weatherization of an
estimated 186,779 homes in FY 2002 and 200,000–250,000 homes/year in previous
years (115). Cumulative energy savings and cost-effectiveness of these activities
are difficult to determine.
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MANAGEMENT OF GOVERNMENT ENERGY USE
The federal government is the nation’s largest consumer of energy products and ser-
vices (∼$200 billion/year) and has considerable influence on markets for energy-
efficient products. Thus, several programs and regulations have been implemented
to promote energy conservation at federal government agencies.
Federal Energy Management Program
DOE’s Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) was established in 1973 to
encourage effective energy management in the federal government to save taxpayer
dollars and reduce emissions. FEMP offers many types of services to government
agencies, including financing for energy-efficient investments and technical assis-
tance (e.g., energy audits).
The FEMP FY 2002 budget was $24.8 million, more than half of which was
allocated to project financing ($8.7 million) and technical guidance and assistance
($7.9 million) (116). Little analysis has determined the aggregate benefits and
cost-effectiveness of this funding. However, between FY 1985 and FY 2001, the
energy intensity of government buildings decreased by 23%; six agencies reduced
energy use by more than 20%/gross square foot during that time (116). With total
energy use in federal buildings of about 0.3 quads, this reduction amounts to a
savings of about 0.07 quads/year relative to a 1985 base. Because of significant
changes in government energy use (e.g., military base closings), whether these
intensity reductions resulted from technological improvements or simply changes
in federal energy use is unclear. How much usage would have changed in the
absence of FEMP also is unclear.
Federal Procurement
Federal agencies, which collectively purchase at least 10% of all energy-using
products in the United States, are required to choose “life-cycle cost-effective”
ENERGY STAR products over other products (117). If ENERGY STAR labels do
not apply, then products must be in the upper 25% of the energy efficiency range
designated by FEMP.
Harris & Johnson (118) estimate that combined savings from federal energy-
efficient procurement policies will be 11 trillion to 42 trillion Btu/year by 2010,
representing a reduced energy cost of $160 million to $620 million/year or ∼3%
to 12% of the year 2000 energy use in federal buildings. Also by 2010, estimated
annual savings stemming from energy-efficient purchasing by states, local gov-
ernments, and schools as a result of the ENERGY STAR Purchasing Program will
be 40 trillion to 150 trillion Btu/year. Combined savings are estimated to reduce
annual CO2 emissions by about 2.4 million to 8.6 million metric tons of carbon
(about 0.1% to 0.5% of projected U.S. carbon emissions of ∼1.8 billion metric
tons of carbon equivalents) by 2010 (119).
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SYNTHESIS
Given the limitations of existing information and program data incompatibility,
assessing the overall and comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of the
energy conservation programs reviewed in this chapter is nearly impossible. We
nonetheless searched for and report estimates of annual energy savings and the
annual costs of obtaining those savings for 2000 or a proximate year (Table 2).
We report the cost-effectiveness of conservation programs in dollars per quad
of energy saved, whenever possible. If information was available from multiple
sources (e.g., utility-based DSM), we report a range of cost-effectiveness estimates
that can be compared with the value of energy saved, including any additional
social value associated with reduced energy-related harm to the environment. In
some cases, we calculated estimated annual energy savings or costs from related
published data (e.g., multiple-year program costs). We also report estimates of
carbon emissions avoided as a result of the reported energy savings. Underlying
sources and assumptions (and critical assessment thereof), a detailed explanation
of our calculation methods, and caveats and comments appear in Gillingham et al.
(2).
Appliance Standards
The equipment cost of energy efficiency investments in any particular year will
yield energy savings several years into the future. The annualized economic cost
in 2000 of these past investments includes annual depreciation plus financing
costs. Unfortunately, the published literature—some of which estimates annual
expenditures on energy-efficient equipment—provides no estimates of the annual
economic cost in 2000 as we define it.
To calculate annual economic costs in 2000 on the basis of existing estimates,
we used the perpetual inventory method commonly used to estimate the capital
portion of annual production costs (120). This method considers a consumer’s
additional expense incurred as a result of appliance standards as a depreciable
investment that yields benefits in future years. Results indicate that, on average,
the package of appliance standards yields positive net benefits to consumers. Even
if unaccounted-for costs of appliance standards are almost equal to those included
in the study or if actual energy savings are roughly half of those estimated, appliance
standards still would yield positive net benefits on average. Adding the positive
environmental benefits of reduced electricity consumption would strengthen the
argument that the benefits of appliance standards are worth the cost.
Financial Incentive Programs: Utility-Based DSM
The only financial incentive programs for which we were able to find estimates of
energy savings were utility-based DSM programs. The EIA reports not the annual
costs associated with all the DSM programs contributing to these energy savings in
2000 but the incremental costs to utilities of new or expanded DSM programs for
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each year of the survey (42). Like appliance standards, these utility expenditures
typically yield energy savings for many years into the future; so again, we used
the perpetual inventory method to develop comparable estimates.
The average electricity price in 2002—a proxy for the average value of energy
saved as a result of DSM—was $6.3 billion/quad. This value is higher than our
estimate and many of those in the literature, suggesting that, in aggregate, DSM
programs have been cost-effective. However, some published cost estimates (in-
cluding the EIA data from which our estimate is derived) are based on utility costs
only, and accounting for costs to consumers may increase the cost-effectiveness
range. A downward adjustment in energy savings to account for free-rider or re-
bound effects also would increase the range, but an adjustment to account for
spillover or free-driver effects could decrease this range.
Finally, utility-based DSM programs are considerably heterogeneous, both in
their cost-effectiveness and their methodologies for measuring ex post energy
savings. The costs reported here combine both high- and low-cost DSM programs;
thus, DSM programs with lower costs and larger positive net benefits than our
average do exist (see some cost-effectiveness examples in References 79 and 121).
In practice, an economically sound strategy would emphasize the DSM activities
with the highest cost-effectiveness and eliminate those that decrease average cost-
effectiveness.
Information and Voluntary Programs
The largest components of estimated annual energy savings from information and
voluntary programs are associated with ENERGY STAR, Climate Challenge, and
1605b voluntary registration of emissions reductions programs; remaining savings
estimates are from WAP, IACs, and Rebuild America (see Table 2 and references
therein). Cost-effectiveness estimates are not available for any of the informational
and voluntary programs.
Management of Government Energy Use
Ex post estimates of government energy reductions, available only for the FEMP,
suggest that government energy use has declined (116). However, it is not clear
to what extent these savings are the result of the program and would not have
occurred otherwise. FEMP probably has saved energy, but no further information
is available on which to base a range.
Environmental Benefits
To simplify the calculation of environmental benefits resulting from emissions
reductions in Table 3, we assumed that all savings were in the form of electricity.
To allow data comparison with Table 2, we used estimates from as close to the year
2000 as possible and assumed that recent policies are in place, providing a sense of
what the environmental benefits would be for near-term energy efficiency policies.
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Although more uncertain than the energy reductions from which they result,
total additional benefits of the four pollutants for which we have estimates (CO2,
NOx, SO2, and PM10) may be just over 10% of the value of energy savings from
energy efficiency policies. A cursory sensitivity analysis with higher values of
environmental benefits (in dollars/ton) indicates that doubling the values of our
estimated environmental benefits for CO2, NOx, SO2, and PM10 would increase
the overall results only slightly, from 10% to 20%.
CONCLUSIONS
Along with increasing carbon sequestration and switching to low- and no-carbon
fuels, improving the energy efficiency of the economy is a primary avenue for
reducing CO2 emissions associated with fossil fuel combustion. Improved energy
efficiency also may serve energy security goals by lessening the effect of fuel
supply disruptions and reshaping electricity load profiles to avoid peak-period
disruptions.
In researching the role of energy efficiency policies, we quickly encountered
data problems; limits to information; and deep-seated methodological challenges
and debates about how to properly measure and predict the costs, benefits, and
effectiveness of past and future policies. For example, some analysts maintain that
greater energy efficiency could substantially reduce carbon emissions at very low,
zero, or even negative cost to the U.S. economy (109, 126); many economists are
more skeptical.
Bringing together existing estimates of the effects of the energy conservation
programs, the literature identifies energy savings of up to 4 quads/year and carbon
emissions reductions of up to 63 million metric tons/year (∼4% of emissions in
2000), mostly as a result of appliance standards and utility-based DSM programs.
ENERGY STAR, Section 1605b, and Climate Challenge programs also may pro-
vide large benefits. Including other energy efficiency programs, such as building
codes and new research and development, would increase this estimate further.
The literature on appliance standards and utility-based DSM only provides
a rough measure of how the average costs of saving energy compare with the
average value of those savings. Appliance standards as a group appear to be cost-
effective on the basis of existing estimates and typically yield positive net benefits
from energy savings alone and additional benefits from ancillary reductions in
air pollution. Utility-based DSM programs also appear to be cost-effective using
many existing estimates, but the degree to which unaccounted costs to consumers
are high (making these programs less cost-effective) remains a topic for further
research. The cost-effectiveness of DSM programs also is quite heterogeneous,
so some low-cost DSM programs have large positive net benefits, suggesting that
eliminating the least cost-effective DSM activities may be beneficial.
Including the additional environmental benefits from reducing CO2, NOx, SO2,
and PM10 emissions could add ∼10% to the value of energy savings from energy
efficiency programs. Most of these benefits are derived from CO2 (7%), with fewer
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benefits from NOx (2%), SO2 (0.5%), and PM10 (0.5%). Including environmen-
tal benefits strengthens the case for appliance standards and utility-based DSM
programs, but not by a large percentage.
The use of energy efficiency policies to reduce energy consumption and car-
bon emissions over more than two decades and the prospect of expanded and
new policies on the horizon suggest that such policies will have a lasting pres-
ence. Although existing estimates indicate that policies examined in this paper
have had a modest impact, well-designed future policies can potentially further
reduce energy and emissions. Estimating the magnitude and cost of such reduc-
tions is beyond the scope of this review but remains a fertile area for continued
research.
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